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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, - : Case No. 920191-CA 
vs. : 
LAMONTE J. BAGLEY, : 
Priority Classification No, 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal concerning the ruling on the defendants 
Motion to Suppress Evidence by the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1992). The Defendant appeals the 
judgement on the Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Was the drug evidence seized by a lawful search of 
defendants car through lawful consent, or by reason of probable 
cause? 
2. Should the evidence obtained during an illegal search 
be admitted as evidence? 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lamonte Bagley, and John R, Popejoy, not a 
party to this appeal, were traveling northbound on 1-15 near Nephi, 
Utah. The defendant was stopped by Trooper Paul Mangelson, of the 
Utah Highway Patrol, and subsequently arrested for possession of 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant made a Motion to suppress the drug evidence 
on the basis that it was illegally obtained. This motion was 
denied by the Fourth Judicial District Court. Mr. Bagley was tried 
by a jury and found guilty of Third degree felony. He was 
sentenced to serve time. The defendant now appeals this sentence 
on the arguments presented in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 14, 1992 the defendant was passenger in the car 
driving through Juab County. It is the defendants testimony that 
the trip was to and from Mesquite, Nevada for the purpose of 
acquiring some car parts. (T. page 103.) 
At approximately 2:50 p.m. on May 14, 1992, Trooper Paul 
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Mangelson, stopped the car for going 70 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone. 
Trooper Mangelson obtained a valid drivers license and 
registration. Mangelson then testified that he detected an odor of 
marijuana about the vehicle. He then made further inquiries as to 
where they had been. (T. page 63 and 64.) 
Trooper Mangelson then testified that the driver, Mr. 
Popejoy, became increasingly nervous as Mangelson continued to ask 
questions. Based on this nervousness, Trooper Mangelson asked if 
they were in possession of any drugs, and continued questioning by 
asking permission to search the vehicle. (T. page 65.) Mangelson 
testified that the defendant and Mr. Popejoy were extremely 
cooperative and started showing Mangelson the vehicle. (T. page 
65. ) 
However, the defendant testified that when Mangelson 
asked to search the vehicle, both himself and Mr. Popejoy replied 
in the negative. (T. page 115.) In fact when Trooper Mangelson 
wanted to look in the trunk of the car, and Mr. Popejoy objected, 
asking if a search warrant was needed, Trooper Mangelson replied 
that none was needed. (T. page 116.) 
After Trooper Mangelson checked the interior of the 
vehicle, he then, to the objection of the occupants, asked to look 
in the trunk of the car. Over the objection of the occupants a 
search was conducted. There were a couple of suitcases found in the 
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trunk. A large gray suit case was claimed, according to the 
officers testimony, by the defendant. However, the defendant 
claims that Mr. Popejoy said that the suitcase belonged to the 
defendant, when in fact the suitcase belonged to Mr. Popejoy. The 
defendant was intimidated and afraid of Mr. Popejoy and did not 
make any objection, as to the ownership designation of the 
suitcase. (T. page 66 and 120.) 
The defendant testified that when asked to open the 
suitcase, he said that the lock sticks and a screwdriver may be 
necessary to open the suitcase. The Trooper then went to his car 
and retrieved the screwdriver. Mangelson then looked at the 
Defendant and said, "Why don't you just open it? I know what's in 
it. I can smell it," Trooper Mangelson also testified that he 
could detect the odor of raw marijuana. (T. page 67.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was no probable cause for the search of the vehicle 
in which the defendant was passenger. This is for several reasons; 
First, the searching trooper based his search on the nervous 
behavior of the driver of the car, reasoning that nervousness means 
that something illegal is transpiring. However, many jurisdictions 
have found that nervous behavior is not probable cause for a 
search. Second, the trial court should have found that the 
defendant was entitled to miranda warnings against self-
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incrimination. The accusatory statements by Trooper Mangelson, 
subjects the defendant to custodial interrogation. And third, the 
testimony of the defendant and the arresting officer is 
conflicting, and the court should have been cautious that the 
evidence was weighed properly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TROOPER MANGELSON 
TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE 
In the Fourth Amendment to the Untied States Constitution 
and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14, individuals 
are specifically guaranteed the right that they will be secured 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the present case it 
will be shown that these rights of the defendant were violated. 
As the uncontested facts state, the defendant was a 
passenger in a car stopped by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul 
Mangelson, for speeding. Trooper Mangelson testified that he asked 
to search the vehicle on the basis that the driver, Mr. Popejoy, 
was acting nervous. This is clearly no cause for the search of the 
defendants vehicle. 
Many individuals may find themselves intimidated and 
nervous when stopped by an officer for even a routine traffic 
violation. The courts have stated that nervous behavior is not a 
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justifiable cause for the search of a vehicle. In the Sierra case, 
and State v. Lovegren 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 81, the courts address 
"nervous behcivior" . Quoting from Seirra the court states: 
Such nervous conduct on Sierra's part when 
confronted by a Utah Highway Patrol trooper is 
consistent with innocent as well as criminal 
behavior. See Tru.iillo, 739 P. 2d at 89. 
Sierra did not try to evade Officer Smith, nor 
did he attempt to conceal anything when 
pursued by Officer Smith. See Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 184. Sierra changed lanes and pulled 
over to the emergency lane upon Officer 
Smith's signal. 
The defendant, Mr. Bagley and the driver of the vehicle, 
Mr. Popejoy, acted in the same manner as Mr. Sierra, acting nervous 
but at the same time being very cooperative. In Sierra, the court 
found that nervous behavior is not probable cause to suspect an 
individual of criminal activity. 
Based on the lack of probable cause for a search of a 
vehicle, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE WEIGHED CAREFULLY THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONY 
As it is stated in the context of this brief, the 
testimony of Trooper Mangelson and Mr. Bagley is conflicting. Due 
to that fact, the court should have used caution in determining the 
validity of the officers actions. 
In the present case as the record has shown there was 
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some conflict in the testimony as to the consent to search the 
vehicle. Trooper Mangelson testifies that Mr. Bagley and Mr. 
Popejoy were very cooperative. (T. page). However, conflicting 
with Trooper Mangelson5s testimony, is the testimony of the 
defendant. He testified that neither he or Mr. Popejoy consented 
to the search of the vehicle. In fact, Mr. Popejoy even asked 
Trooper Mangelson if a search warrant was needed to search the 
trunk• 
The courts have set out a standard to determine valid 
consent to search a vehicle. In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
App. 1990), the court states that it is the burden of the State to 
prove that the consent was voluntary. Webb goes on to present an 
analysis which a court must use to show that the State has met its 
burden of proof. 
(l)There must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was "unequivocal and 
specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2)The government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
The burden was not met by the state showing that there 
was any consent to search the vehicle in question. 
The court may have based the admission of evidence on the 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this court should 
reverse the decision made on the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 15th day of October, L992. y 
MILTON r. HARMON 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE 0F MAILING 
I hereby certify that T mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BrieX^Of Appellant to: Mr. Lamonte J. Bagley, 
1254 West_l_lth North SLC, W_; Mr. Donald J. Eyre J. Juab County Attorney, 
125 North main Street, Neplii, UT 84648; and to Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, 
Utah Attorney General, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake Citj, UT 
84111; first-class postage prepaid, this 15th day of October, 
1992. 
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C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E Ul 
[Criminal ncliotc- 3rnviPu?iiB COIIC«M uiu>* 
Due process *»!' • :, » and jus t t'DniponHn;-- •* 
clauses.! 
No person shall he Iw-hl u-. nimw^t u i a cap<u< 
otherwise infamous ciime, unless on a present-; 
or indictment of a Ciaud Juiy , except in cases ni i.-.. », 
in the land or naval forces, or in Hie Militia, when n 
actual service in time of War OJ public danger; i,..r 
shall any person ho subject for tin* name offence to he 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he com-
pelled in any criminal cane to be a witness against 
himself nor be deprived of life, liberty, or piopo-i1* 
without Hie pioross of law; m ; r.hall piivate piop.-j 
he iakr fur public use. u i t i u u l j u s t compel.*-.. • 
CONSTITUTION iW UTAH 
AJITII/LF1 I 
DECLARATION OV UK'. I ITS 
Sec.
 ; K : H ; sj ul ,. . • • 
* • .una! prosecute • - • -til h.*-. »* <,-
•mpear and deles.»i .n |«*;>on ami by eon*: • 
10 dec -ul the nature and cause of the aceu&tit.-": 
agains dm, to have a copy I hot oof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to he confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory pioeess lo compel the atten-
dance c. vitnesscs in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public al by an impartial jury of the county or d.-
trict in hich the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, ! ml the right to appeal in nil cases. In no 
instance ihall any accused peraon, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to Be-
cure the lights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife Bhall not he compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against Ids wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the Bame offense. 
